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Abstract—Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) with suc-
cessive interference cancellation receiver is considered as one
of the most potent multiple access techniques to be adopted in
future wireless communication networks. Data security in the
NOMA transmission scheme is on much attention drawing issue.
Blockchain is a distributed peer-to-peer network enables a way of
protecting information from unauthorized access, tempering etc.
By utilizing encryption techniques of blockchain, a secured data
communication scheme using blockchain in NOMA is proposed in
this paper. A two-phase encryption technique with key generation
using different parameter is proposed. In the first-phase data
is encrypted by imposing users’ public key and in the second
phase, a private key of the base station (BS) is engaged for
encryption. Finally, the superiority of the proposed scheme over
existing scheme is proven through a comparative study based on
the different features.
Index Terms—Blockchain, data security, next generation wire-
less communication, non-orthogonal multiple access, successive
interference cancellation
I. INTRODUCTION
THE provision of high data rate and facilitation of multipleusers to communicate simultaneously within a core net-
work is very crucial to meet the quality of service requirement
in the era of evolving wireless communication technologies.
Simultaneous information exchange among a large number of
devices by exploiting limited bandwidth is another challenge
of future wireless communication. To overcome the problems
and meet the challenges of upcoming wireless networks, non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) technique with successive
interference cancellation (SIC) receiver is considered as one
of the most promising multiple access techniques [1]–[4].
In NOMA, multiple users are facilitated to transmit/receive
data simultaneously at the same frequency by using power
division multiplexing. In downlink NOMA, a base station (BS)
transmits superposed data for the intended users by allocating
more power to the weaker user UE2 (User Equipment) data
than stronger user UE1 data, as shown in Fig. 1. UE1 first
decodes data bits of UE2. After reconstructing the signal
related to those decoded data bits, it’s been cancelled from the
total received signal. This traditional successive interference
cancellation continues till the decoding of UE1’s data bits.
As described earlier, due to the way of traditional SIC
procedure, the data of the weak user is not secured to the
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Fig. 1. Basic downlink NOMA with SIC.
strong user. Moreover, most of the existing NOMA-based
systems mainly focus on traditional SIC [1]–[6]. That is why
proper security is needed during SIC to prevent leakage of
weak users’ data information to the strong user.
A secure way of performing SIC for NOMA was discussed
in [7]. In [7], they have shown similar concern about afore-
mentioned security issues. In order to solve that, they have
adopted symmetric key encryption and they have generated the
key based on international mobile equipment identity (IMEI),
media access control (MAC) address. Using IMEI and MAC
address could pose vulnerability towards spoofing attack. They
have tried to solve it using ”sticky MAC address”. But this
technique is used only by the vendors named CISCO and
Juniper. So, this could not give solutions to the aforementioned
security issues for all users.
Blockchain has recently gained tremendous attention due
to its promise of ensuring security of data. Blockchain is
a data structure which is shared and replicated among the
participant of the network. Blockchain was first introduced
by Satoshi Nakamoto with bitcoin [8]. In blockchain, a pair
of keys (private/public) is adopted. The public key is used
as an identity for the user so that users’ privacy can remain
concealed and the private key is used for encrypting data so
that data can remain protected [9], [10]. However, this privacy978-1-5386-6163-5/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE
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Fig. 2. Existing data handover scheme [7].
protection technique can mitigate the issue of disclosing data
to the strongest user.
In this paper, a blockchain based secure data handover
technique in NOMA is proposed in order to mitigate the
mentioned above-mentioned security issues. The contribution
of this paper is outlined below:
• A key generation technique is proposed using different
parameter.
• A two-phase encryption is proposed so that data can be
protected from any kind of attacks.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as fol-
lows: Section II illustrates the existing data handover scheme.
The proposed blockchain based data handover scheme is
portrayed in Section III. A performance comparison between
proposed scheme and [7] is demonstrated in Section IV.
Finally, Section V draws a conclusion from this paper with
future research directions.
II. EXISTING DATA HANDOVER SCHEME
Existing data handover scheme contains UEs, eNodeB
(Evolved Node-B), and PGW (Packet gateway), as shown in
Fig. 2. All the notations and their description are provided
in Table I. Fig. 2 illustrates data handover scheme assuming
two UEs, one BS, one PGW and the scheme is considered for
downlink transmission. The procedure of existing handover
applying SIC is depicted below [7]:
1) Both UE1 and UE2 send data request to eNodeB which
eNodeB forwards to PGW.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS AND THEIR DESCRIPTION
Notation Description
PKUEth Public key for UEth
PRUEth Private key for UEth
PRB Private key for BS
ZBD Blockchain based database
pth Allocated power for UEth
P Total allocated power
Mth Signals for UEth
EPK(.) Encryption using public key
EPR(.) Encryption using private key
DPK(.) Decryption using public key
DPR(.) Decryption using private key
IM IMEI
M MAC address
T Timestamp
Lat Latitude
Lon Longitude
2) PGW picks unencrypted M2 and M1 for UE2 and UE1
respectively, and forwards to eNodeB.
3) After getting M2 and M1 from PGW, eNodeB allocates
power p1 and p2 with signals of UE2 and UE1 respec-
tively, and superposes both signals to P = p1 ⊕ p2.
eNodeB returns M2 and M1 with P back to UE2 and
UE1.
4) When UE1 receives data from eNodeB, it decodes all
data bits subsequently and after decoding, it subtracts
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Fig. 3. Proposed data handover scheme.
signals of UE2 in order to extract its own data. After
that, it retrieves its own data by computing from M1.
5) UE2 extract its data considering signal of UE1 as a noise.
As the existing scheme does not contain any encryption
techniques, data becomes vulnerable to attack. Since UE1
decodes UE2’s data, UE1 may use UE2’s data for unethical
purposes.
III. PROPOSED BLOCKCHAIN BASED DATA HANDOVER
We have proposed a secure data handover process in NOMA
with the integration of Blockchain. The proposed scheme
contains three parts such as (1) public/private key generation,
(2) encryption process in BS, and (3) decryption process in
UE.
A. Public/private key generation
In the proposed scheme, private/public keys play a very
significant role. These keys are used for first-phase encryption.
The proposed scheme assumes a protected area in UE, named
Kaladanda Box (KBox), which preserves credentials like UE’s
private/public key, BS’s private key. An assumption is made
that when UE registers in the BS, BS shares its private key
PRB with every registered UE. PRB uses for second-phase
encryption. However, before registering in BS, UE generates
the public key and broadcast it for secure communication. In
order to construct the public key, a private key is needed. Let
PRUEi is a private key of i
th UE.
PRUEi = SHA256(IMi,Mi, Ti, Lati, Loni)
Here, i ∈ {1, 2, ...., n} and n is total UE and for our
proposed scheme n = 2 and let PRUE is a set of UE’s private
key.
PRUE = {PRUE1 , PRUE2 , ....., PRUEn}6=
Let G is a set of (x, y) coordinates on the elliptic curve.
PKUEi = PRUEi ⊗ (Gx, Gy)
After generating the public key, UE broadcasts, and saves
public key KBox for decrypting data bits.
B. Encryption process in BS
In this part, a two-phase encryption is adopted in order to
give protection against different kinds of attacks, as shown in
Fig. 3. In the first phase, an asymmetric encryption technique
is adopted and data is encrypted by UE’s public key so that
only authorized UE can decrypt it using the private key.
In the second phase, a symmetric encryption technique is
adopted and data again encrypted using BS’s private key so
that only legitimate can access data and become safe from
eavesdroppers. We have assumed a modified version of eN-
odeB named blockchain supported Node-B (bNodeB) which
supports blockchain integration in the BS. First, both UE2 and
UE1 send data requests to bNodeB by sending Datarequest(UE2)
and Datarequest(UE1) respectively. bNodeB forwards the request
to PGW to process the request. When PGW gets requests
from UE2 and UE1, PGW retrieves public keys of both UE2
and UE1 from blockchain based identity management server
(BIMS) by sending PKrequest(UE2, UE1). BIMS responds with
PKUE2 and PKUE1. Let ZBD is the blockchain based database
that manages public keys.
PKUE2, PKUE1 ∈ ZBD | PKUE2 6= PKUE1
As PK is used both as an identity and as securing data
packet, each user’s PK should be unique. In order to make PK
unique, we choose not only unique IMEI, MAC address, but
also timestamp and spatial information for generating users’
key. The key becomes strong after mixing timestamp and
spatial information because if any hacker tries to clone IMEI
or spoof the MAC address, he still needs timestamp and spatial
information to clone private/public key. However, PGW picks
M2 and M1 for UE2 and UE1 respectively. Let x2 and x1 are
encrypted packets.
x2 = EPK(M2)
UE2
x1 = EPK(M1)
UE1
PGW forwards these encrypted data x2 and x1 to bNodeB
for further processing. As bNodeB receives x2 and x1, bN-
odeB allocates power p2 and p1 with signals of UE2 and UE1
respectively, and superposes both signals to P = p1 ⊕ p2.
After that, both x2 and x1 experience encryption by employing
PRB . Let M∗ is encrypted packets.
M∗ = EPR(x2 ⊕ x1)B
Here, only legitimate users hold PRB .
C. Decryption process in UE
In this part, a two-phase decryption process is discussed in
Algorithm 1. Upon receiving a response from bNodeB, both
UE1 and UE2 first try to decrypt received packets DPR(M∗)B
using PRB . As both UE1 and UE2 is legitimate users, both
UE1 and UE2 contains PRB in its KBox. After that, UE1
subtracts UE2’s data after decoding all the bits sequentially
in order to extract its own data. As data for both UE2 and
UE1 is encrypted by their public key, UE1 requires UE2’s
private key in order to read UE2’s data. So, UE2’s data remains
protected during decoding. However, UE1 decrypts its data
DPR(M1)
UE1 using PRUE1. After the decryption process, UE1
retrieves its own data by computing from dbm. Following this,
UE2 decrypts data DPR(M∗)B using PRB . UE2 extracts its
own data considering UE1’s data as a noise. After extracting
data, UE2 decrypts data DPR(M2)UE2 using PRUE2. Finally,
UE2 retrieves its own data by computing from dbm.
Algorithm 1: Two-phase decryption process in UE
1 UE : set of resgitered user.
2 M∗ : encrypted data bits from BS.
3 b = DPR(M
∗)B .
4 if UE1 ∈ UE then
5 while b ∈ b do
6 db = decode(b).
7 if db /∈ UE1 then
8 db .
9 else
10 db
Include
=====⇒M1.
11 end
12 end
13 dbm = DPR(M1)
UE1.
14 else
15 while b ∈ b do
16 db = decode(b).
17 if db /∈ UE2 then
18 db .
19 else
20 db
Include
=====⇒M2.
21 end
22 end
23 dbm = DPR(M2)
UE2.
24 end
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A performance comparison is outlined in Table II. The
features that take into consideration for performance analysis
are delineated below:
User privacy
This feature protects the user personal information
from leaking while registering in BS. The proposed
scheme has taken into consideration on the issue
and proposed to share information in minimum level
which is managed in blockchain.
Encryption
This feature protects data from unauthorized access.
Both proposed scheme and secure SIC [7] have intro-
duced two-phase encryption. The proposed scheme
has adopted asymmetric encryption using the public
key in the first phase and symmetric encryption
using the private key of BS in the second phase.
On the contrary, secure SIC [7] has used symmetric
encryption in both phases.
Key generation
This feature covers comparison of properties that are
used for key generation. Secure SIC [7] has utilized
IMEI and MAC address for generating the key. On
the contrary, the proposed scheme has taken not only
IMEI and MAC address into consideration, but also
has taken timestamp and spatial information into
consideration. The key generation for the attacker
is much more difficult in the proposed scheme than
secure SIC [7].
Protection against spoofing attack
This feature supports the protection against spoofing
attack. Both proposed and secure SIC [7] has pro-
posed protection against spoofing attack. However,
the solution in secure SIC [7] only covers two
vendors named CISCO and Juniper. But the solution
in the proposed schemes supports every user.
Protection against data hijacking
This feature supports data protection against unau-
thorized access. Both the proposed scheme and se-
cure SIC [7] have provided their solution against
hijacking data by employing encryption.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN PROPOSED SCHEME AND SECURE
SIC [7]
Features
Proposed
Proposed scheme Secure SIC [7]
User privacy yes no
Encryption yes yes
Key generation
IMEI, MAC
address,
timestamp, spatial
information
IMEI, MAC
address
Protection against
spoofing attack for all
partial (only for
CISCO and
Juniper)
Protection against data
hijacking yes yes
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a secure data handover
scheme combining with blockchain. In the proposed scheme,
UE generates a private key based on IMEI, MAC address,
timestamp, Lat, and Lon. After that UE generates public key
out of private key and shared with BS and also BS shares
its private key to the registered users so that only legitimate
users can access transmitted information. Complexity analysis
of adopting both symmetric and asymmetric encryption in
NOMA along with secrecy analysis is kept for future extension
of this paper. However, the detailed discussion regarding UE’s
identity management using blockchain needs to be researched
which can be subjected to future works.
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